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Abstract
We study the problem of differentially private constrained maximization of decomposable
submodular functions. A submodular function is decomposable if it takes the form of a sum of
submodular functions. The special case of maximizing a monotone, decomposable submodular
function under cardinality constraints is known as the Combinatorial Public Projects (CPP)
problem [Papadimitriou et al., 2008]. Previous work by Gupta et al. [2010] gave a differentially
private algorithm for the CPP problem.
We extend this work by designing differentially private algorithms for both monotone and
non-monotone decomposable submodular maximization under general matroid constraints, with
competitive utility guarantees. We complement our theoretical bounds with experiments demon-
strating empirical performance, which improves over the differentially private algorithms for the
general case of submodular maximization and is close to the performance of non-private algo-
rithms.
1 Introduction
A set function f : 2N → R is submodular if it satisfies the following property of diminishing marginal
returns: for all sets S ⊆ T ⊆ N and every element u ∈ N \T , f(S∪{u})−f(S) ≥ f(T ∪{u})−f(T ).
In other words, the marginal contribution of any element u to the value of the function f(S)
diminishes as the input set S increases in size.
The theory of submodular maximization provides a unifying framework which captures many
combinatorial optimization problems, including Max Cut, Max r-Cover, Facility Location, and Gen-
eralized Assignment problems. Optimization problems involving the maximization of a submodular
objective function arise naturally in many different applications, which span a wide range of fields
such as computer vision, operations research, electrical networks, and combinatorial optimization
(see for example [Narayanan, 1997, Fujishige, 2005, Schrijver, 2003]). Furthermore, submodular
functions are extensively used in economics (e.g., in the problem of welfare maximization in com-
binatorial auctions [Dobzinski and Schapira, 2006, Feige, 2006, Feige and Vondrák, 2006, Vondrák,
2008]) because their diminishing returns property captures the preferences of agents for substitutable
goods.
Recently, submodular maximization has found numerous applications to problems in machine
learning [Kawahara et al., 2009]. Such applications include the problems of influence maximiza-
tion in social networks [Kempe et al., 2003, Borgs et al., 2014, Borodin et al., 2017], result diver-
sification in recommender systems [Puthiya Parambath et al., 2016], feature selection for classifi-
cation [Krause and Guestrin, 2005], dictionary selection [Krause and Cevher, 2010], document and
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corpus summarization [Lin and Bilmes, 2011, Kirchhoff and Bilmes, 2014, Sipos et al., 2012], crowd
teaching [Singla et al., 2014], and exemplar-based clustering [Dueck and Frey, 2007, Gomes and Krause,
2010].
In all these settings, the goal is to optimize a submodular function f subject to certain constraints.
These constraints can be simple, such as cardinality constraints (i.e., max{f(S) : |S| ≤ r}) or more
general matroid constraints (e.g., a partition matroid max{f(S) : |S ∪ Pi| ≤ 1,∀i}, where Pi ⊂ N
are disjoint sets). We give the formal definition of matroid constraints in Section 2.2.
In most applications, these machine learning tools are applied to users’ sensitive data, causing
privacy concerns to become increasingly important, and motivating the study of private submodular
maximization. Differential Privacy (DP) [Dwork et al., 2006] has been widely-accepted as a robust
mathematical guarantee that a model produced by a machine learning algorithm does not reveal
sensitive, personal information contained in the training data. Informally, DP ensures that the
output of the algorithm will not change significantly if one individual’s input is swapped with
another’s. We provide the formal definition in Section 2.3.
Notably, Mitrovic et al. [2017] gave differentially private algorithms for monotone and non-
monotone submodular maximization under cardinality, matroid, and p-extendible system constraints.
Gupta et al. [2010] studied a variety of combinatorial optimization problems under differential pri-
vacy and, in particular, gave a differentially private algorithm for the Combinatorial Public Projects
(CPP) problem introduced by Papadimitriou et al. [2008]. This is a special case of monotone sub-
modular maximization under cardinality constraints, as the objective function f is decomposable
(also known as Sum-of-Submodular), i.e., it is the sum of submodular functions. The goal is then
to find the set that maximizes f , while protecting the private valuation functions of the individual
users.
Decomposable submodular functions encompass many of the examples of submodular functions
studied in the context of machine learning as well as welfare maximization. In the latter, each agent
has a valuation function over sets, and the goal is to maximize the sum of the valuations of the
agents, i.e., the “social welfare”. The valuation functions are often submodular as they exhibit the
diminishing returns property. In machine learning, data summarization, where the goal is to select a
representative subset of elements of small size, falls into this setting and has numerous applications,
including exemplar-based clustering, image summarization, recommender systems, active set selec-
tion, and document and corpus summarization. The line of work of Mirzasoleiman et al. [2016a,b,c]
studies decomposable submbodular maximization under matroid and p-systems constraints in vari-
ous data summarization settings and takes different approaches to user privacy.
1.1 Our contributions
We focus on the problem of maximization of a decomposable submodular function under matroid
constraints. Concretely, suppose there exists a set of agents D of sizem and a ground set of elements
N of size n. We assume that each agent I has a submodular function fI : 2N → [0, λ], and the
goal is to find the subset S ⊆ N maximizing f(S) = ∑I∈D fI(S) subject to a matroid constraint
M = (N ,I) of rank r, under differential privacy.
We provide two algorithms for the maximization of a decomposable submodular function under
matroid constraints both for the case of monotone and non-monotone functions. Our algorithms
have competitive utility guarantees, as presented in the next theorems, where f(OPT) denotes the
value of the optimal non-private solution. The complete results for monotone and non-monotone
decomposable functions can be found in Sections 3 and 4, respectively.
Theorem 1.1 (Informal). If f is a monotone λ-decomposable function, then there exists an (ε, δ)-
differentially private algorithm for maximization of f under matroid constraints of rank r, which,
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given parameters η, γ, ε, δ, returns a set S such that, with probability 1− γ,
E[f(S)] ≥ (1− 1/e−O(η))f(OPT)−O
(
λr
ηε
log
nr
ηγ
· log 1
δ
)
.
Theorem 1.2 (Informal). If f is a non-monotone λ-decomposable function, then there exists an
(ε, δ)-differentially private algorithm for maximization of f under matroid constraints of rank r,
which, given parameters η, γ, ε, δ, returns a set S such that, with probability 1− γ,
E[f(S)] ≥ (1/e −O(η))f(OPT)−O
(
λr
ηε
log
nr
ηγ
· log 1
δ
)
.
Our results extend the results of Gupta et al. [2010] from cardinality to matroid constraints, as
well as non-monotone functions. We note that the multiplicative factor of our utility guarantee for
the monotone case is optimal for the non-private version of the problem and the additive factor is
optimal for any ε-differentially private algorithm for the problem (see lower bound by Gupta et al.
2010, Thm. 8.5). Our solution exhibits a tradeoff between the multiplicative and the additive factor
of the utility through the parameter η, which depends on the chosen number of rounds of the
algorithm and is a small constant.
In comparison, the general case of submodular function maximization assumes functions of
bounded sensitivity, that is, maxS maxA,B |fA(S)− fB(S)| ≤ λ for A,B sets of agents that differ in
at most one agent. The decomposability assumption allows us to improve on the utility guarantees
of the general case of the maximization of monotone and non-monotone submodular λ-sensitive
functions, studied by Mitrovic et al. [2017], in our multiplicative and additive factor. We remark
that Mitrovic et al. [2017] also note that using their general greedy algorithm for monotone sub-
modular maximization under matroid constraints with the analysis of Gupta et al. [2010] yields a
result for decomposable functions with improved additive error compared to the general case.
In proving our results, we also fix a lemma that is essential in the privacy analysis of the CPP
problem of Gupta et al. [2010] and, in turn, in the result for decomposable monotone submodular
maximization under matroid constraints of [Mitrovic et al., 2017] that was mentioned above, which
allows for the improved additive factor in the utility of the algorithms.
Our contributions are summarized Table 1.
r−Cardinality Matroid (rank r)
λ
-d
ec
om
p
os
ab
le
Monotone
(
1− 1e
)
f(OPT)− rλε log n
(
1− 1e − η
)
f(OPT)− rληε log n [This work]
[GLMRT10] 12f(OPT)− rλε log n [MBKK17]
Non-monotone
(
1
e − η
)
f(OPT)− rληε log n
(
1
e − η
)
f(OPT)− rληε log n
[This work] [This work]
λ
-s
en
si
ti
ve Monotone
(
1− 1e
)
f(OPT)− r3/2λε log n 12f(OPT)− r
3/2λ
ε log n
[MBKK17] [MBKK17]
Non-monotone
1
e
(
1− 1e
)
f(OPT)− r3/2λε log n −
[MBKK17]
Table 1: Expected utility guarantees of (ε, δ)-differentially private submodular maximization algo-
rithms. All results omit any log 1δ and constant factors.
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We complement our theoretical bounds with experiments on a dataset of Uber pickups in Man-
hattan [UberDataset, 2014] in Section 5. We show that our algorithms perform better than the more
general algorithms of [Mitrovic et al., 2017] for monotone submodular maximization under matroid
and cardinality constraints, and they are competitive with the non-private greedy algorithm.
1.2 Related work
Submodular maximization There is a vast literature on submodular maximization (see [Buchbinder and Feldman,
2018] for a survey), for which the greedy technique has been a dominant approach. Nemhauser et al.
[1978] introduced the basic greedy algorithm for the maximization of a monotone submodular func-
tion, that iteratively builds a solution by choosing the item with the largest marginal gain with
respect to the set of previously selected items. This algorithm achieves a
(
1− 1e
)
-approximation
for a cardinality constraint (which is optimal [Raz and Safra, 1997]) and a 12 -approximation for a
matroid constraint.
Calinescu et al. [2011] developed a framework based on continuous optimization and rounding
that led to an optimal
(
1− 1e
)
-approximation for the problem. The approach is to turn the discrete
optimization problem of maximizing a submodular function f subject to a matroid constraint into
a continuous optimization problem of maximizing the multilinear extension F of f (a continuous
function that extends f) subject to the matroid polytope (a convex polytope whose vertices are
the feasible integral solutions). The continuous optimization problem can be solved approximately
within a
(
1− 1e
)
factor using a Continuous Greedy algorithm [Vondrák, 2008].
In each round t = 1, . . . , T , the Continuous Greedy algorithm estimates the marginal gains of
each element u with respect to the current fractional solution y(t) within a small sampling error, that
is, it estimates F (y(t) ∧ 1u) − F (y(t)) = E
[
f(R(y(t)) ∪ {u})− f(R(y(t)))], where R(y) is a random
set which contains each element v independently with probability yv. The algorithm then finds an
independent set, B(t), of the matroid, which maximizes the sum of the estimated marginal gains of
the items. It then updates the current fractional solution by taking a small step η = 1/T in the
direction of the selected set: y(t+1) = y(t) + η1B(t) . The final fractional solution y
(T ) can then be
rounded to an integral one without loss [Chekuri et al., 2010].
The Measured Continuous Greedy algorithm introduced by Feldman et al. [2011] is a unify-
ing variant of the continuous greedy algorithm, which increases the coordinates of its fractional
solution more slowly, and achieves a 1e -approximation factor for the more general case of non-
monotone submodular functions. This is not the optimal constant factor approximation for the
problem [Buchbinder and Feldman, 2019, Ene and Nguyen, 2016], but the structure of the algo-
rithm helps in its private adaptation.
Private submodular maximization The private algorithms of [Mitrovic et al., 2017] and [Gupta et al.,
2010] are based on the discrete greedy algorithm, where the greedy step of selecting an item in each
round is instead implemented via the differentially private Exponential Mechanism of McSherry and Talwar
[2007], which guarantees that the item selected in each round is almost as good as the true
marginal gain maximizer, with high probability. In general, by the advanced composition prop-
erty of DP [Dwork et al., 2010], r consecutive runs of an ε-differentially private algorithm lead to
a cumulative privacy guarantee of the order of
√
rε. Remarkably, for the case of decomposable
monotone submodular functions, Gupta et al. [2010] show that the privacy guarantee of r rounds
is, up to constant factors, the same as that of a single run of the Exponential Mechanism.
The main idea of this improvement is the following. Let A,B be two sets of agents which
differ in the individual I, as A = B ∪ {I}. The privacy loss of the algorithm is bounded by the
sum over the rounds of the expected marginal gains of each item with respect to the valuation
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function of agent I, where the expected value is calculated over a distribution that depends on
the valuation functions of the rest of the agents B. More formally, the privacy loss is bounded by∑r
i=1 Eu
[fI(Si−1 ∪ {u}) − fI(Si−1)]. By a key lemma, whose proof we fix and state in Section 3, this
is bounded by a function of the sum of the realized marginal gains
∑r
i=1[fI(Si−1∪{ui})−fI(Si−1)] =∑r
i=1[fI(Si)− fI(Si−1)] = fI(S)− fI(∅), which in turn is bounded by λ. Note that it is important
in this argument that the sum telescopes to the total utility gain of the submodular function fI .
Finally, we also note that, in principle, differentially private submodular optimization is related
to submodular maximization in the presence of noise [Hassidim and Singer, 2017]. However, the
structure of the noise is of multiplicative nature, so it is not clear how these algorithms could be
applicable.
1.3 Techniques
Our algorithms for the monotone and non-monotone problems are a private adaptation of the Con-
tinuous and Measured Continuous Greedy algorithms, respectively. They both use the Exponential
Mechanism to greedily find an independent set B(t,r) in each round t and update with this set the
current fractional solution. Our privacy analysis is based on the technique of [Gupta et al., 2010].
Let us now explain the main challenges in its application. Recall that we use the continuous
greedy algorithm to achieve the optimal multiplicative guarantee for the monotone case, which
means that instead of calculating the marginal gain of each element u ∈ N in each round with
respect to f , we have to estimate it with respect to f ’s multilinear extension F . That is, we
estimate the quantinty F (y(t,i−1) ∧ 1u)− F (y(t,i−1)) = E
R
[
f(R(y(t,i−1)) ∪ {u}) − f(R(y(t,i−1))].
First, since the random sets R(y(t,i−1)) used for this estimation are drawn independently in each
round, the final sum of estimated marginal gains of fI is not a telescoping sum. Second, even if
instead we use concentration to argue that the final sum is close to the true marginal gains with
respect to FI , this would lead to a final telescoping sum in the order of Tλ. To overcome both these
problems:
1. We choose the smoother marginal gains F (y(t,i−1) + η1u) − F (y(t,i−1)), so that the realized
marginal gain is FI(y(t,i))−FI(y(t,i−1)), which, by concentration, leads to the telescoping sum
FI(y
(T,r))−FI(y(1,0)) up to the sampling error term. However, this modification is not enough,
as the sampling error would be on the order of m, the number of agents. In the interesting
regimes, this is a large enough so that we would want to avoid any dependence on m in the
utility or sample complexity.
2. We introduce a function G : [0, 1]N → R. The function G is not submodular but it is a
proxy for F . To construct G, we draw uniform vectors rj ∈ [0, 1]N in the beginning of the
algorithm, and define G(x) to be the average over samples f({u ∈ N : rju < xu}). Therefore,
GI(x) is always bounded by λ and the sum of estimated marginal gains of agent I telescopes to
GI(y
(T,r))−GI(y(1,0)) ≤ λ. Hence, G’s sampling error only affects the utility of the algorithm.
Finally, further applying this technique to non-monotone functions requires a bound on the sum
of the absolute marginal gains (equivalently, the “total movement”) of a non-monotone submodular
function on non-decreasing inputs. This bound does not hold in general for any non-monotone
function, but it holds for submodular functions, as we show in Section 4.
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2 Preliminaries
Let N be the set of elements and let |N | = n. We denote by 1S ∈ [0, 1]n the indicator vector of
the set S, that is, a vector y = 1S if yu = 1 for u ∈ S and yu = 0 otherwise. We will slightly abuse
notation and denote 1{u} by 1u and 1N\{u} by 1u¯. Let U denote the uniform distribution over [0, 1].
We will write r ← Un for the random vector drawn from the product of uniform distributions. We
write log for the natural logarithm.
2.1 Submodular functions
We consider decomposable submodular functions f(S) =
∑
I∈D fI(S) where D is a set of agents of
size |D| = m. More formally, we have the following definitions.
Definition 2.1. A set function f : 2N → R+ is submodular if for all sets S ⊆ T ⊆ N and every
element u ∈ N \ T , we have f(S ∪ {u}) − f(S) ≥ f(T ∪ {u}) − f(T ).
Note that we consider only non-negative submodular functions. Moreover, if f(S) ≤ f(T ) for
all S ⊆ T ⊆ N , we say that f is monotone.
Definition 2.2. A function f : 2N → R is λ-decomposable if f(S) = ∑I∈D fI(S) ∀S ⊆ N , for
submodular functions fI : 2
N → [0, λ].
For ease of notation, we will assume λ = 1. This is equivalent to adding a pre-processing step to
scale the function by 1/λ, which only affects the additive error of our approximation guarantees. By
multiplying the additive error by λ, we can retrieve the general result for λ-decomposable functions.
Definition 2.3. The multilinear extension of a submodular function f is F (x) = E[f(R(x))] where
R(x) is a random set which contains each element u ∈ N independently with probability xu. Specif-
ically, we can write
F (x) =
∑
S⊆N
f(S)
∏
u∈S
xu
∏
u/∈S
(1− xu).
By linearity of expectation, if f is a decomposable submodular function, its multilinear extension
satisfies F (x) =
∑
I∈D FI(x), where FI is the multilinear extension of fI for any agent I.
2.2 Matroid constraints
A matroid is formally defined as follows.
Definition 2.4. A matroid is a pair M = (N ,I) where I ∈ 2N is a collection of independent sets,
satisfying
(i) A ⊆ B, B ∈ I ⇒ A ∈ I, and
(ii) A,B ∈ I, |A| < |B| ⇒ ∃i ∈ B \A such that A ∪ {i} ∈ I.
Let P (M) ⊆ [0, 1]N be the convex body which contains the characteristic vectors of the sets in
the matroid constraint set I . We assume it is down-closed, that is for x ≤ x′ (where “≤” denotes
coordinate-wise comparison) if x′ ∈ P (M) then x ∈ P (M).
A maximal independent set is called a basis for the matroid. We denote the set of bases by B.
Also, we let r = maxB∈I |B| ≤ n be the maximum size of a basis in I , i.e., the rank of the matroid.
We state the following useful property of the matroid’s bases.
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Lemma 2.5 (Schrijver 2003, Corollary 39.12A). Let M = (N ,I) be a matroid and B1, B2 ∈
B be two bases. Then there is a bijection φ : B1 → B2 such that for every b ∈ B1 we have
B1 \ {b} ∪ {φ(b)} ∈ B.
Our randomized algorithms aim to find a fractional solution y which maximizes F (y). To
round this solution to an integral one, we appeal to the Swap-Rounding procedure, introduced
by Chekuri et al. [2010].
Lemma 2.6 (Swap-Rounding, Chekuri et al. [2010]). Let (y1, . . . , yn) ∈ P (M) be a fractional
solution in the matroid polytope and (Y1, . . . , Yn) ∈ P (M) ∩ {0, 1}n be an integral solution obtained
using randomized swap rounding. Then for any submodular function f : {0, 1}n → R and its
multilinear extension F : [0, 1]n → R, it holds that
E[f(Y1, . . . , Yn)] ≥ F (y1, . . . , yn).
2.3 Differential Privacy
Informally, differential privacy is a property that a randomized algorithm satisfies if its output
distribution does not change significantly under the change of a single data point, which in our case
corresponds to a single agent J and their function fJ .
More formally, let D,D′ ∈ D be two sets of agent functions. We say that D,D′ are neighbors,
denoted as D ∼ D′, if they differ in at most one agent, that is, D = D′ ∪ {fJ} \ {fJ ′}.
Definition 2.7 (Differential Privacy, Dwork et al. [2006]). A randomized algorithm A : D → R is
(ε, δ)-differentially private if for all neighboring sets D,D′ and any measurable output set R ⊆ R,
Pr[A(D) ∈ R] ≤ exp(ε) Pr[A(D′) ∈ R]+ δ.
Algorithm A is (ε, 0)-differentially private if it satisfies the definition for δ = 0.
A useful property of differential privacy is that it is closed under post-processing.
Lemma 2.8 (Post-Processing, Dwork et al. [2006]). Let A : D → R be a randomized algorithm
that is (ε, δ)-differentially private. For every (possibly randomized) f : R → R′, f ◦ A is (ε, δ)-
differentially private.
The Exponential Mechanism is a well-known algorithm, which serves as a building block for
many differentially private algorithms. The mechanism is used in cases where we need to choose the
optimal output with respect to some scoring function on the data set. More formally, let R denote
the range of the outputs and let q : D ×R → R be the scoring function which maps the data set -
output pairs to utility scores. The sensitivity of the scoring function is defined as
∆q = max
r∈R
max
D∼D′
|q(D, r)− q(D′, r)|.
Next, we define the Exponential Mechanism and present its guarantees.
Lemma 2.9 (Exponential Mechanism, McSherry and Talwar [2007]). Let input set D ∈ D, range
R, and utility function q : D × R → R. The Exponential Mechanism Oε(q) selects and outputs
an element r ∈ R with probability proportional to exp
(
ε·q(D,r)
2∆q
)
. The Exponential Mechanism is
(ε, 0)-differentially private and with probability at least 1− γ,
|max
r∈R
q(D, r)− q(D,Oε(q))| ≤ 2∆q
ε
log
( |R|
γ
)
.
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2.4 Concentration inequalities
In order to estimate the multilinear extension of f on any input y, we sample random sets based
on y and query the value of the function on those sets. We will use the following concentration
inequalities, to bound the sampling error of our estimate. The next lemma is proven as Theorems
4.4 and 4.5 of Mitzenmacher and Upfal [2017].
Lemma 2.10 (Chernoff Bounds, [Mitzenmacher and Upfal, 2017]). Let X1, . . . ,Xs be independent
random variables such that for each j ∈ [s], Xj ∈ [0, R]. Let X = 1s
∑s
j=1Xj and µ = E[X]. Then
P[X < (1− ζ)µ] ≤ exp(−sζ2µ/2R)
P[X > (1 + ζ)µ] ≤ exp(−sζ2µ/3R)
P[X > (1 + ζ)µ] ≤ exp(−sζµ/3R),
where the latter inequality holds for ζ ≥ 1 and the first two hold for ζ ∈ (0, 1).
Corollary 2.11 (Relative and Additive Chernoff Bound). Let X1, . . . ,Xs be independent random
variables such that for each j ∈ [s], Xj ∈ [0, R]. Let X = 1s
∑s
j=1Xj and µ = E[X]. Then for
α, β ∈ [0, 1],
P[X < (1− α)µ − β] ≤ exp(−sαβ/R)
P[X > (1 + α)µ + β] ≤ exp(−sαβ/3R)
Proof. We first prove the first inequality. Note that if µ ≤ β then the inequality is trivially true so
we only need to consider µ > β. Let ℓ = α+ βµ . Notice that ℓ
2 ≥ 2αβµ . Thus, by Lemma 2.10,
P[X < (1− α)µ − β] = P[X < (1− ℓ)µ] ≤ exp(−sℓ2µ/2R) ≤ exp(−sαβ/R).
Next we prove the second inequality. Again let ℓ = α+ βµ . If ℓ < 1 then by Lemma 2.10,
P[X > (1 + α)µ + β] ≤ exp(−sℓ2µ/3R) ≤ exp(−2sαβ/3R).
If ℓ ≥ 1 then P[X > (1 + α)µ+ β] ≤ exp(−sℓµ/3R) ≤ exp(−sβ/3R) ≤ exp(−sαβ/3R). This
concludes the proof of the corollary.
3 Monotone Decomposable Submodular Maximization
In this section, we present our differentially private algorithm for the problem of maximizing a 1-
decomposable monotone function f(S) =
∑
I∈D fI(S) under matroid constraintsM = (N ,I). That
is, f consists of the sum of |D| = m non-negative monotone submodular functions fI : 2N → [0, 1]
and thus maxS f(S) ≤ m. Let OPT = argmaxS∈If(S) be an optimal solution and f(OPT) its value.
Algorithm 1 is an adaptation of the Continuous Greedy algorithm introduced by Calinescu et al.
[2011]. In each round t ∈ [T ], Algorithm 1 greedily constructs a feasible set B(t,r) ∈ I and overall
takes an η-step towards that direction, that is, y(t+1,0) = y(t,0) + η1B(t,r) . To construct the feasible
set B(t,r) ∈ I , in each (t, i) round, the algorithm picks an element u(t,i) ∈ N (t,i) which is feasible
with respect to the current set B(t,i−1) and which approximately maximizes the marginal gain from
the current fractional solution y(t,i−1).
We denote the true marginal gain of an element u ∈ N in round (t, i) by
w
(t,i)
D (u) = F (y
(t,i−1) + η1u)− F (y(t,i−1)).
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We let G(x) be the estimate of F (x) for any point x ∈ [0, 1]n. To compute G, we generate s
uniformly random vectors rj ← Un for j ∈ [s] in the beginning of the algorithm and set
G(x) =
1
s
s∑
j=1
f({u ∈ N : rju < xu}).
Thus, the estimated marginal gain of an element u ∈ N in round (t, i) is
w˜
(t,i)
D (u) = G(y
(t,i−1) + η1u)−G(y(t,i−1)).
We similarly define GI(x) = 1s
∑s
j=1 fI({u ∈ N : rju < xu}) for any agent I and write w(t,i)I (u)
for the marginal gain with respect to FI and w˜
(t,i)
I (u) for the marginal gain with respect to GI .
To find the approximately maximizing element u(t,i) in each round, we use the Exponential
Mechanism, Oε0(·), with the scoring function w˜(t,i)D . Note that the the scoring function does not
explicitly take the protected data {fI}I∈D as an input but we denote its dependence on the agent
set D as a subscript.
Algorithm 1 Private Continuous Greedy
1: Input: Utility parameters η, γ ∈ (0, 1], privacy parameters ε, δ ∈ (0, 1], and set of agents D.
2: Let T ← ⌈ 1η ⌉ and ε0 ← 2 log
(
1 + ε4+log(1/δ)
)
.
3: Draw s = 6r2T 4 log(n/γ) independent random vectors such that rj ← Un for all j ∈ [s].
4: y(1,0) = 1∅.
5: for t = 1, . . . , T do
6: B(t,0) = ∅.
7: for i = 1, . . . , r do
8: Let N (t,i) = {u ∈ N \B(t,i−1) : B(t,i−1) ∪ {u} ∈ I}.
9: if N (t,i) = ∅ then let y(t+1,0) = y(t,i−1) and break the loop.
10: Define w˜(t,i)D (u) = G(y
(t,i−1) + η1u)−G(y(t,i−1)) for all u ∈ N (t,i).
11: Let u(t,i) ← Oε0(w˜(t,i)D ).
12: Let y(t,i) = y(t,i−1) + η1u(t,i) .
13: Let B(t,i) ← B(t,i−1) ∪ {u(t,i)}.
14: y(t+1,0) = y(t,r).
15: return Swap-Rounding(y(T,r),I).
The main result of this section is the following.
Theorem 3.1. Let f : 2N → R+, where |N | = n, be a monotone, 1-decomposable, submodular
function and M = (N ,I) a matroid of rank r. Algorithm 1 with parameters η and γ is (ε, δ)-
differentially private and returns a set S ∈ I such that, with probability 1− γ,
E[f(S)] ≥ (1− 1/e−O(η))f(OPT)−O
(
r
ηε
log
nr
ηγ
· log 1
δ
)
.
Algorithm 1 makes O
(
nr3
η5 log
n
γ
)
oracle calls.
We prove the theorem by combining the utility and privacy guarantees of our algorithm, as
stated in Theorem 3.6 and Theorem 3.9, respectively. We remark that Theorem 3.6 lower bounds
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the utility of the fractional solution F (y(T,r)). Since y(T,r) =
∑T
t=1 η1B(t,r) , where B
(t,r) ∈ I for all
t ∈ [T ], it follows that y(T,r) ∈ P(M) and Lemma 2.6 can be applied to yield the final guarantees
of the integral solution returned by the swap-rounding process.1 We also note that the number of
oracle calls corresponds to the number of samples s used to estimate G accurately in all possible
y(t,i) intermediate points of the algorithm.
3.1 Function Estimation
We first show that G is a good proxy for F by bounding the sampling error. The number of samples
required by the algorithm is determined as such, so that the sampling error is bounded for any
possible run (i.e., sequence of picks) of the algorithm.
Recall that we define one sample from a multilinear extension F (x) as f({u ∈ N : vu < xu})
where v ← Un. The following lemma holds for any submodular function f and shows that each
sample’s expected value is indeed F (x).
Lemma 3.2. For a submodular function f : 2N → R and its multilinear extension F , for any point
x ∈ [0, 1]N
E
v←Un
[f({u ∈ N : vu < xu})] = F (x).
Proof. We prove this result by induction on n. For simplicity, we identify the n element set N with
[n]. Recall that, by definition, F (x) =
∑
S⊆2N f(S)
∏
i∈S xi
∏
i 6∈S(1− xi). For n = 1, it holds that
E
v←Un
[f({u ∈ N : vu < xu})] = x1 · f({1}) + (1− x1) · f(∅) =
∑
S⊆2{1}
f(S)
∏
i∈S
xi
∏
i 6∈S
(1− xi).
Now suppose that the statement holds for up to n− 1, in which case we have that
E
v←Un
[f({u ∈ N : vu < xu})] =P[vn < xn] · E
v←Un
[f({n} ∪ {u ∈ N \ {n} : vu < xu})]
+ P[vn ≥ xn] · E
v←Un
[f({u ∈ N \ {n} : vu < xu})]
=P[vn < xn] ·
∑
S⊆2N\{n}
f(S ∪ {n})
∏
i∈S
xi
∏
i/∈S,i 6=n
(1− xi)
+ P[vn ≥ xn] ·
∑
S⊆2N\{n}
f(S)
∏
i∈S
xi
∏
i/∈S,i 6=n
(1− xi)
=xn ·
∑
S⊆2N\{n}
f(S ∪ {n})
∏
i∈S
xi
∏
i/∈S,i 6=n
(1− xi)
+ (1− xn) ·
∑
S⊆2N\{n}
f(S)
∏
i∈S
xi
∏
i/∈S,i 6=n
(1− xi)
=
∑
xn∈S⊆2N
f(S)
∏
i∈S
xi
∏
i/∈S,i 6=n
(1− xi)
+
∑
S⊆2N\{n}
f(S)
∏
i∈S
xi
∏
i/∈S
(1− xi)
=
∑
S⊆2N
f(S)
∏
i∈S
xi
∏
i/∈S
(1− xi) = F (x).
This concludes the proof of the lemma.
1Note that since 1 + η ≥ Tη ≥ 1, we might need to scale down y(T,r) by (1 + η) to ensure that y(T,r) ∈ P(M).
This would only change the multiplicative factor of the utility guarantee by a constant in the term O(η).
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The next lemma shows that the estimated marginal gains w˜(t,i)D (u) are indeed concentrated
around their expected value w(t,i)D (u).
Lemma 3.3. With probability at least 1 − 2γ, for any sequence of points picked by the algorithm{{u(t,i)}ri=1}Tt=1 and any u ∈ N , it holds that
(1− η)w(t,i)D (u)−
ηf(OPT)
rT
≤ w˜(t,i)D (u) ≤ (1 + η)w(t,i)D (u) +
ηf(OPT)
rT
.
Proof. Fix a point y(t,i−1) and element u ∈ N . Then w˜(t,i)D = G(y(t,i−1) + η1u) − G(y(t,i−1)) =
1
s
∑s
j=1Xj where we define
Xj = f({v ∈ N : rjv < y(t,i−1)v + η1{v = u}})− f({v ∈ N : rjv < y(t,i−1)v }).
The random variables Xj are independent since the random vectors rj are also independent. Let us
denote the random set based on the vector rj as Rj = {v ∈ N : rjv < y(t,i−1)v }. Then either Xj = 0
or Xj = f(Rj ∪ {u}) − f(Rj). In the latter case, by submodularity, Xj ≤ f({u}) − f(∅) and by
non-negativity Xj ≤ f(OPT). By monotonocity, Xj ≥ 0. Thus, it always holds that Xj ∈ [0, f(OPT)].
By Lemma 3.2 and linearity of expectation, it also holds that
E
[
w˜
(t,i)
D (u)
]
=
1
s
s∑
j=1
E[Xj] = F (y
(t,i−1) + η1u)− F (y(t,i−1)) = w(t,i)D (u) (1)
Note that the number of samples s = 6r2T 4 log(n/γ) ≥ 3rTη2 log
(
n · nrT /γ). By Corollary 2.11
and equation (1) and since Xj ∈ [0, f(OPT)], we have that:
P
[
w˜
(t,i)
D (u) < (1− η)w(t,i)D (u)−
ηf(OPT)
rT
]
≤ exp
(
−sη ηf(OPT)rT
f(OPT)
)
= exp
(
−3rT log n
γ
)
≤ γ
nrT+1
P
[
w˜
(t,i)
D (u) > (1 + η)w
(t,i)
D (u) +
ηf(OPT)
rT
]
≤ exp
(
−sη ηf(OPT)rT
3f(OPT)
)
= exp
(
−rT log n
γ
)
≤ γ
nrT+1
It follows by union bound that with probability 1− 2γ/nrT+1,
(1− η)w(t,i)D (u)−
ηf(OPT)
rT
≤ w˜(t,i)D (u) ≤ (1 + η)w(t,i)D (u) +
ηf(OPT)
rT
.
The number of all possible sequences of points y(t,i) is at most the number of possible sequences of
picked points u(t,i), which is bounded by nrT . By union bound over all sequences of points y(t,i) and
elements u ∈ N , the inequalities hold with probability at least 1− 2γ.
3.2 Utility Analysis
Having bounded the error introduced by sampling, we now move on to bounding the error introduced
by privacy. The next claim (Claim 3.4) bounds the sensitivity of the estimated marginal gains, which
in turn bounds the error of the Exponential Mechanism (Claim 3.5). Note that, for ease of exposition,
we consider neighboring datasets to be A,B such that A \B = I, which we later make up for in the
privacy analysis of this section.
Claim 3.4. Let us denote the sensitivity of w˜
(t,i)
D by ∆w˜
(t,i). For any t ∈ [T ], i ∈ [r], it holds that
∆w˜(t,i) ≤ 1.
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Proof. Let A,B be any two neighboring datasets such that A \B = I. Then
∆w˜(t,i) = max
u∈N
|w˜(t,i)A (u)− w˜(t,i)B (u)|
= max
u∈N
|GA(y(t,i−1) + η1u)−GA(y(t,i−1))−GB(y(t,i−1) + η1u) +GB(y(t,i−1))|
= max
u∈N
|GI(y(t,i−1) + η1u)−GI(y(t,i−1))|
= max
u∈N
∣∣∣∣∣∣
1
s
s∑
j=1
[
fI({v ∈ N : rjv < y(t,i−1)v + η1{v = u}})− fI({v ∈ N : rjv < y(t,i−1)v })
]∣∣∣∣∣∣
≤ max
u∈N
1
s
s∑
j=1
|fI({v ∈ N : rjv < y(t,i−1)v } ∪ {u}) − fI({v ∈ N : rjv < y(t,i−1)v })|
≤ 1. (since fI : 2N → [0, 1] ∀I ∈ D)
Claim 3.5. With probability at least 1− γ, for all t ∈ [T ], i ∈ [r], and for all u ∈ N ,
w˜
(t,i)
D (u
(t,i)) ≥ w˜(t,i)D (u)−
2
ε0
log(nrT/γ).
Proof. Fix round (t, i). By the guarantees of the Exponential Mechanism (Lemma 2.9), with prob-
ability 1− γrT we have that for all u ∈ N ,
w˜
(t,i)
D (u
(t,i)) ≥ w˜(t,i)D (u)−
2∆w˜(t,i)
ε0
log
|N (t,i)|rT
γ
≥ w˜(t,i)D (u)−
2
ε0
log
nrT
γ
(by Claim 3.4 and |N (t,i)| ≤ |N | = n)
By union bound, the inequality holds for all rounds i ∈ [r] and t ∈ [T ] and u ∈ N with
probability at least 1− γ.
We are now ready to prove the utility guarantee of our algorithm. The proof follows the main
steps of the proof of the performance guarantees of the Continuous Greedy algorithm, yet accounting
for the discretization, the sampling error, and the error of the Exponential Mechanism.
Theorem 3.6. With probability at least 1− 3γ,
F (y(T+1,0)) ≥ (1− 1/e −O(η))f(OPT)− 8r
ηε0
log
nr
ηγ
.
Proof. We condition on the event that for all rounds t ∈ [T ], i ∈ [r], and elements u ∈ N ,
(1− η)w(t,i)D (u)−
ηf(OPT)
rT
≤ w˜(t,i)D (u) ≤ (1 + η)w(t,i)D (u) +
ηf(OPT)
rT
.
By Lemma 3.3, this is true with probability at least 1−2γ. We start by lower bounding the increase
in utility between the fractional solutions at the beginning of two consecutive outer loops. It holds:
F (y(t+1,0))− F (y(t,0)) = F (y(t,r))− F (y(t,0))
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=
r∑
i=1
[F (y(t,i))− F (y(t,i−1))]
=
r∑
i=1
w
(t,i)
D (u
(t,i)) (since y(t,i) = y(t,i−1) + η1u(t,i))
≥
r∑
i=1
1
1 + η
w˜
(t,i)
D (u
(t,i))− r ηf(OPT)
(1 + η)rT
(by Lemma 3.3)
≥ 1
1 + η
r∑
i=1
w˜
(t,i)
D (u
(t,i))− ηf(OPT)
T
We assume that |B(t,r)| = r for any t ∈ [T ]. This can be achieved without loss of generality
by adding “dummy” elements of value 0. By Lemma 2.5, there exists a bijection φ such that
φ(u(t,i)) = o(t,i), where OPT = {o(t,1), . . . , o(t,r)} is the optimal solution. Now, note that since o(t,i)
is a feasible option in the i-th round, by the guarantees of the Exponential Mechanism (Claim 3.5),
with probability 1− γ we have that
w˜
(t,i)
D (u
(t,i)) ≥ w˜(t,i)D (o(t,i))−
2
ε0
log
nrT
γ
,
for all rounds i ∈ [r] and t ∈ [T ]. We condition on this event for the rest of the proof.
It follows that with probability 1− 3γ,
F (y(t+1,0))− F (y(t,0)) ≥ 1
1 + η
r∑
i=1
w˜
(t,i)
D (o
(t,i))− ηf(OPT)
T
− 2r
(1 + η)ε0
log
nrT
γ
≥ 1− η
1 + η
r∑
i=1
w
(t,i)
D (o
(t,i))− 2ηf(OPT)
T
− 2r
ε0
log
nrT
γ
, (2)
where the last inequality follows from Lemma 3.3.
Claim 3.7. For all t ∈ [T ],
r∑
i=1
w
(t,i)
D (o
(t,i)) ≥ η[F (y(t,r) ∨ 1OPT)− F (y(t,r))].
Moreover, since f is monotone, F (y(t,r) ∨ 1OPT) ≥ f(OPT).
Proof of Claim 3.7. By the definition of the weights, it holds that
r∑
i=1
w
(t,i)
D (o
(t,i)) =
r∑
i=1
F (y(t,i−1) + η1o(t,i))− F (y(t,i))
= η
r∑
i=1
[F (y(t,i−1) ∨ 1o(t,i))− F (y(t,i−1) ∧ 1o¯(t,i))]
≥ η
r∑
i=1
[F (y(t,i−1) ∨ 1o(t,i))− F (y(t,i−1))] (by monotonicity)
≥ η
r∑
i=1
[F (y(t,r) ∨ 1o(t,i))− F (y(t,r))]
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≥ η[F (y(t,r) ∨ 1OPT)− F (y(t,r))], (by submodularity)
where the second to last inequality follows by monotonicity and submodularity, since y(t,r) ≥ y(t,i−1)
for all i ∈ [r].
Substituting the bounds of Claim 3.7 in inequality (2), we get that
F (y(t+1,0))− F (y(t,0)) ≥ η1− η
1 + η
[f(OPT)− F (y(t+1,0))]− 2ηf(OPT)
T
− 2r
ε0
log
nrT
γ
≥ η[(1 − 2η)f(OPT)− F (y(t+1,0))]− 2ηf(OPT)
T
− 2r
ε0
log
nrT
γ
,
where the last inequality holds by non-negativity.
Let us denote Ω = (1− 2η)f(OPT) and ξ = 2ηf(OPT)T + 2rε0 log nrTγ . Then,
F (y(t+1,0))− F (y(t,0)) ≥ η[Ω − F (y(t+1,0))]− ξ
⇒ Ω− F (y(t+1,0)) ≤ Ω− F (y(t,0))− η[Ω − F (y(t+1,0))] + ξ
⇒ Ω− F (y(t+1,0)) ≤ Ω− F (y
(t,0))
1 + η
+
ξ
1 + η
⇒ Ω− F (y(T+1,0)) ≤ Ω− F (y
(1,0))
(1 + η)T
+ ξ
T∑
t=1
(1 + η)−t
⇒ Ω− F (y(T+1,0)) ≤ 1
(1 + η)T
Ω+ Tξ (by non-negativity F (y(1,0)) = f(∅) ≥ 0)
⇒ F (y(T+1,0)) ≥
(
1− 1
(1 + η)T
)
Ω− Tξ.
By substituting the values for Ω and ξ, we have that with probability at least 1− 3γ,
F (y(T+1,0)) ≥ (1− 1/e−O(η))f(OPT)− 2ηf(OPT)− 2rT
ε0
log
nrT
γ
≥ (1− 1/e−O(η))f(OPT)− 8r
ηε0
log
nr
ηγ
(since T = ⌈ 1η ⌉ ≤ 2η )
This concludes the proof of the theorem.
3.3 Privacy Analysis
For the privacy analysis, we need the following concentration bound (Claim 3.8). A stronger version
of this bound also appears in [Gupta et al., 2010], but its proof is not entirely correct. We provide
a correct proof, albeit for a slightly weaker statement with respect to the constant factor.
Consider a probabilistic process that proceeds in rounds, in which a random variable is picked
from different distributions in each round. Informally, the next claim bounds the sum of the expected
values of the samples by the sum of their realized values.
Claim 3.8. Consider an n-round probabilistic process. In each round i ∈ [n], an adversary chooses
a distribution Di over [0, 1] and a sample Ri is drawn from this distribution. Let Z1 = 1 and
Zi+1 = Zi −RiZi. We define the random variable Yj =
∑n
i=j ZiE[Ri]. Then for any j ∈ [n],
P[Yj ≥ qZj] ≤ exp(3− q).
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Proof. The proof is by reverse induction on j. For j = n, Yn = E[Rn]Zn ≤ Zn since Dn is a
distribution on [0, 1] and has expectation at most 1. It follows that P[Yn ≥ qZn] = 0 for any q > 1
and the claim is trivially true for j = n and for any q.
For the inductive step, suppose that P[Yj+1 ≥ qZj+1] ≤ exp(3− q). We will prove that P[Yj ≥ qZj ] ≤
exp(3− q). For q ≤ 3 the LHS is at least 1, so the claim is trivially true. Let us denote µj = E[Rj].
In what follows, the expectation is over Rj ← Dj . It holds that
P[Yj ≥ qZj] = E[P[Yj+1 ≥ qZj − µjZj ]]
= E
[
P
[
Yj+1 ≥ q − µj
1−Rj · Zj+1
]]
≤ E
[
exp
(
3− q − µj
1−Rj
)]
(by the inductive hypothesis)
So it suffices to prove that E
[
exp
(
3− q−µj1−Rj
)]
≤ exp(3− q) for the case q > 3. This is equivalent
to proving the following inequality, for q > 3:
E
[
exp
(
µj − qRj
1−Rj
)]
≤ 1
Let us denote f(Rj) = exp
(
µj−qRj
1−Rj
)
. Calculating the derivatives of the function f with respect to
Rj , we get that:
f ′(Rj) = exp
(
µj − qRj
1−Rj
)
µj − q
(1−Rj)2
and
f ′′(Rj) = exp
(
µj − qRj
1−Rj
)
µj − q
(1−Rj)4 (µj − q + 2− 2Rj)
Since q > 3 and Rj, µj ∈ [0, 1], it holds that f ′′(Rj) > 0 and the function f is convex with respect
to Rj . Therefore,
E[f(Rj)] ≤ E[(1−Rj)f(0) +Rjf(1)] = (1− µj)f(0) + µjf(1) = (1− µj) exp(µj) + 0 ≤ 1.
This concludes the proof of the inductive step and the proof of the claim.
We now prove the privacy guarantees of Algorithm 1. The proof follows the same steps as the
privacy proof for the CPP problem of Gupta et al. [2010]. The main idea is to bound the privacy
loss by a function of the sum of the expected marginal gains of a player I, where each expected value
is taken over different (possibly adversarial) distributions. Using the concentration of Claim 3.8,
we can bound this sum by the sum of the realized marginal gains of player I. Intuitively, the total
“movement” of a monotone function on a sequence of increasing points has to be bounded by its
range. So, since fI is monotone and has range in [0, 1], this sum of realized marginal gains must be
bounded by 1.
Theorem 3.9. Algorithm 1 is
(
(eε0/2 − 1)(4 + log 1δ ), δ
)
-differentially private.
Proof. Let A and B be two sets of agents such that A△B = {I}. Suppose that instead of the output
set, we reveal the sequence in which we pick the elements of our algorithm and let this sequence
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be denoted as U = (u(1,1), u(1,2), . . . , u(T,r)). We are then interested in bounding the ratio of the
probabilities that the output sequence be U under input A and B. By the post-processing property
(Lemma 2.8), this suffices to achieve the same privacy parameters over the output of the algorithm,
Swap-Rounding(y(T,r),I).2
We recall that the scores used in the Exponential Mechanism are w˜(t,i)D (u) = G(y
(t,i−1) + η1u)−
G(y(t,i−1)). For ease of notation, we drop the irrelevant parameters of our algorithm and denote it
by M . By the chain rule of probability,
P[M(A) = U ]
P[M(B) = U ]
=
T∏
t=1
r∏
i=1
exp
(
ε0
2 w˜
(t,i)
A (u
(t,i))
)
/
∑
u∈N (t,i) exp
(
ε0
2 w˜
(t,i)
A (u)
)
exp
(
ε0
2 w˜
(t,i)
B (u
(t,i))
)
/
∑
u∈N (t,i) exp
(
ε0
2 w˜
(t,i)
B (u)
)
=

 T∏
t=1
r∏
i=1
exp
(
ε0
2 w˜
(t,i)
A (u
(t,i))
)
exp
(
ε0
2 w˜
(t,i)
B (u
(t,i))
)



 T∏
t=1
r∏
i=1
∑
u∈N (t,i) exp
(
ε0
2 w˜
(t,i)
B (u)
)
∑
u∈N (t,i) exp
(
ε0
2 w˜
(t,i)
A (u)
)

 (3)
We divide this analysis into two cases: A \B = {I} and B \A = {I}.
If A \B = {I}, the second factor of (3) is bounded above by 1, since w˜(t,i)I (u) ≥ 0,∀u ∈ N , and
the first factor is bounded as follows.
T∏
t=1
r∏
i=1
exp
(
ε0
2 w˜
(t,i)
A (u
(t,i))
)
exp
(
ε0
2 w˜
(t,i)
B (u
(t,i))
) = T∏
t=1
r∏
i=1
exp
(
ε0
2 w˜
(t,i)
I (u
(t,i)) + ε02 w˜
(t,i)
B (u
(t,i))
)
exp
(
ε0
2 w
(t,i)
B (u
(t,i))
)
=
T∏
t=1
r∏
i=1
exp
(ε0
2
w˜
(t,i)
I (u
(t,i))
)
= exp
(
T∑
t=1
r∑
i=1
ε0
2
w˜
(t,i)
I (u
(t,i))
)
= exp
(
ε0
2
T∑
t=1
r∑
i=1
GI(y
(t,i−1) + η1u(t,i))−GI(y(t,i−1))
)
= exp
(ε0
2
(
GI(y
(T,r))−GI(y(1,0))
))
≤ exp
(ε0
2
)
,
where the last inequality holds since fI(S) ∈ [0, 1] for any S ⊆ N .
Let us now consider the second case. If B \ A = {I}, the first factor of (3) is bounded from
above by 1, and the second factor is bounded as follows.
T∏
t=1
r∏
i=1
∑
u∈N (t,i) exp
(
ε0
2 w˜
(t,i)
B (u)
)
∑
u∈N (t,i) exp
(
ε0
2 w˜
(t,i)
A (u)
)
=
T∏
t=1
r∏
i=1
∑
u∈N (t,i) exp
(
ε0
2 w˜
(t,i)
I (u)
)
exp
(
ε0
2 w˜
(t,i)
A (u)
)
∑
u∈N (t,i) exp
(
ε0
2 w˜
(t,i)
A (u)
)
=
T∏
t=1
r∏
i=1
E
u←P (t,i)
[
exp
(ε0
2
w˜
(t,i)
I (u)
)]
2Note that swap-rounding does not access the function again.
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=T∏
t=1
r∏
i=1
E
u←P (t,i)
[
exp
(ε0
2
(GI(y
(t,i−1) + η1u)−GI(y(t,i−1)))
)]
≤
T∏
t=1
r∏
i=1
E
u←P (t,i)
[
1 + (eε0/2 − 1)(GI (y(t,i−1) + η1u)−GI(y(t,i−1)))
]
(ex ≤ 1 + eε0/2−1ε0/2 x ∀x ∈ [0,
ε0
2 ])
≤ exp
(
(eε0/2 − 1)
T∑
t=1
r∑
i=1
E
u←P (t,i)
[
GI(y
(t,i−1) + η1u)−GI(y(t,i−1))
])
. (1 + t ≤ et ∀t)
In this calculation, we define the distributions P (t,i) on N to be P (t,i)(u) = exp
(
ε0
2
w˜
(t,i)
A (u)
)
∑
u∈N (t,i)
exp
(
ε0
2
w˜
(t,i)
A (u)
)
for u ∈ N (t,i) and P (t,i)(u) = 0 otherwise.
Next, we will bound the sum
T∑
t=1
r∑
i=1
E
u←P (t,i)
[
GI(y
(t,i−1) + η1u)−GI(y(t,i−1))
]
.
To this end, we will use Claim 3.8. Consider a Tr-round probabilistic process. In each round (t, i),
an adversary chooses a distribution P (t,i) and then a sample u(t,i) is drawn from that distribution.
Let Z(t,i) = 1 −GI(y(t,i−1)) be the total remaining realized utility at the beginning of round (t, i).
Define the random variable
R(t,i)(u) =
GI(y
(t,i−1) + η1u)−GI(y(t,i−1))
1−GI(y(t,i−1))
,
which denotes the percentage increase in utility if element u is picked during round (t, i). The
distribution of R(t,i)(u), denoted by D
(t,i), is directly determined by P (t,i). Also note that, since fI
is monotone and has range in [0, 1], R(t,i)(u) ∈ [0, 1]. After the element of the round u(t,i) has been
chosen, the total remaining realized utility is updated as Z(t,i) = Z(t,i−1) − R(t,i−1)(u(t,i))Z(t,i−1).
Finally, let Y(τ,j) =
∑
(t,i)≥(τ,j) E
u←P (t,i)
[
R(t,i)(u)
]
Z(t,i). By these definitions, the sum we want to
bound is exactly Y(1,1). By Claim 3.8, the sum Y(1,1) as defined through this random process
satisfies
P
[
Y(1,1) ≥ qZ(1,1)
] ≤ exp(3− q)
⇔P
[
Y(1,1) ≥ q(1−GI(y(1,0)))
]
≤ exp(3− q)
⇒P[Y(1,1) ≥ q] ≤ exp(3− q)
⇒P
[
T∑
t=1
r∑
i=1
E
u
[
GI(y
(t,i) + η1u)−G(y(t,i)))
]
≥ 3 + log 1
δ
]
≤ δ
We conclude that, for B \ A = {I}, with probability at least 1 − δ, the ratio of equation (3) is
bounded by
P[M(A) = U ]
P[M(B) = U ]
≤ exp
(
(eε0/2 − 1)(3 + log 1
δ
)
)
.
More generally, for any two neighboring sets of agents A ∼ B, with probability 1− δ, the ratio
is bounded by
P[M(A) = U ]
P[M(B) = U ]
=
P[M(A) = U ]
P[M(A ∩B) = U ] ·
P[M(A ∩B) = U ]
P[M(B) = U ]
≤ exp
(
ε0
2
+ (eε0/2 − 1)(3 + log 1
δ
)
)
.
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It follows that Algorithm 1 is
(
(eε0/2 − 1)(4 + log 1δ ), δ
)
-differentially private.
4 Non-monotone Decomposable Submodular Maximization
In this section, we present our algorithm for the case of non-monotone functions. Algorithm 2 is an
adaptation of the Measured Continuous Greedy algorithm introduced by Feldman et al. [2011]. The
main difference from Algorithm 1 is the update step in line 12, which also leads to the change of
the definition of the marginal gains w˜(t,i)D (u) in line 10, so that w˜
(t,i)
D (u
(t,i)) = G(y(t,i))−G(y(t,i−1))
still holds.
A technical difference with the previous section is that, since f is not monotone, the marginal
gain of an element could be negative. In practice, non-private algorithms for the problem skip
any round in which all available elements have negative marginal gain. To simulate this behavior
and facilitate the utility analysis, it is common to assume instead that there exists a set N ′ of r
elements in N , whose marginal contribution to any set is 0, that is ∀S ⊆ N , f(S) = f(S \ N ′). If
this condition is not true, then we augment the set of elements N = N ∪N ′.
Since both skipping a round as well as checking for this condition would be problematic for
privacy, we choose to always augment the ground set with r “dummy” elements in the beginning.
So for the rest of this section, we will assume that N ← N ∪N ′ and n ← n + r. This establishes
that in every round there exists at least one element with non-negative marginal gain. Any dummy
elements are later removed from the output set of the algorithm. This does not affect the privacy
guarantees (due to the post-processing property), the optimal solution, or the value of the output3.
Algorithm 2 Private Measured Continuous Greedy
1: Input: Utility parameters η, γ ∈ (0, 1], privacy parameters ε, δ ∈ (0, 1], and set of agents D.
2: Let T ← ⌈ 1η ⌉ and ε0 ← ε/(14 + 4 log(1/δ)).
3: Draw s = 48r3T 7 log(n/γ) independent random vectors such that rj ← Un for all j ∈ [s].
4: y(1,0) = 1∅.
5: for t = 1, . . . , T do
6: B(t,0) = ∅.
7: for i = 1, . . . , r do
8: Let N (t,i) = {u ∈ N \B(t,i−1) : B(t,i−1) ∪ {u} ∈ I}.
9: if N (t,i) = ∅ then let y(t+1,0) = y(t,i−1) and break the loop.
10: Define w˜(t,i)D (u) = G(y
(t,i−1) + η(1− y(t,i−1)u )1u)−G(y(t,i−1)) for all u ∈ N (t,i).
11: Let u(t,i) ← Oε0(w˜(t,i)D ).
12: Let y(t,i) = y(t,i−1) + η(1 − y(t,i−1)
u(t,i)
)1u(t,i) .
13: Let B(t,i) ← B(t,i−1) ∪ {u(t,i)}.
14: y(t+1,0) = y(t,r).
15: return Swap-Rounding(y(T,r),I).
The main result of this section is the following.
Theorem 4.1. Let f : 2N → R+, where |N | = n, be a non-monotone, 1-decomposable, submodular
function and M = (N ,I) a matroid of rank r. Algorithm 2 with parameters η and γ is (ε, δ)-
3The size of the ground set n at most doubles, which only affects the utility by a constant factor in the log.
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differentially private and returns a set S ∈ I such that, with probability 1− γ,
E[f(S)] ≥ (1/e −O(η))f(OPT)−O
(
r
ηε
log
nr
ηγ
· log 1
δ
)
.
Algorithm 2 makes O
(
nr4
η8
log nγ
)
oracle calls.
We prove the theorem by combining the utility and privacy guarantees of our algorithm, as
stated in Theorem 4.3 and Theorem 4.9, respectively. We remark that Theorem 3.6 lower bounds
the utility of the fractional solution F (y(T,r)). Since y(T,r) ≤ ∑Tt=1 η1B(t,r) , where B(t,r) ∈ I for
all t ∈ [T ], and the polytope P(M) is down-closed, it follows that y(T,r) ∈ P(M) and Lemma 2.6
can be applied to yield the final guarantees of the integral solution returned by the swap-rounding
process. Furthermore, removing any elements of N ′ from the solution does not change its value.
4.1 Function Estimation
Let us define w(t,i)D (u) = F (y
(t,i−1) + η(1− y(t,i−1u )1u)− F (y(t,i−1)) for this section. Next, we prove
the sampling error on the new weights w˜(t,i)D (u) as defined in line 10 of Algorithm 2. Note that
since the function is non-monotone, the estimated marginal gains have larger variance (they can be
possibly negative), so the number of samples needed to ensure that they concentrate around their
expected value is larger.
Lemma 4.2. With probability at least 1 − 2γ, for any sequence of points picked by the algorithm{{u(t,i)}ri=1}Tt=1 and any u ∈ N , it holds that
(1− η)w(t,i)D (u)−
ηf(OPT)
rT
≤ w˜(t,i)D (u) ≤ (1 + η)w(t,i)D (u) +
ηf(OPT)
rT
.
Proof. Fix a point y(t,i−1) and element u ∈ N . Then w˜(t,i)D = G(y(t,i−1) + η(1 − y(t,i−1)u )1u) −
G(y(t,i−1)) = 1s
∑s
j=1Xj where we define
Xj = f({v ∈ N : rjv < y(t,i−1)v + η(1− y(t,i−1)u )1{v = u}})− f({v ∈ N : rjv < y(t,i−1)v }).
The random variables Xj are independent since the random vectors rj are also independent. Let us
denote the random set based on the vector rj as Rj(y(t,i−1)) = {v ∈ N : rjv < y(t,i−1)v }. Then either
Xj = 0 or Xj = f(Rj(y(t,i−1)) ∪ {u})− f(Rj(y(t,i−1))). We focus on the latter. First, we prove the
upper bound:
Xj ≤ f({u})− f(∅) (by submodularity)
≤ f({u}) (by non-negativity)
≤ f(OPT) (since u ∈ I)
We now prove the lower bound:
Xj = f(R
j(y(t,i−1)) ∪ {u})− f(Rj(y(t,i−1)))
≥ −f(Rj(y(t,i−1))) (by non-negativity)
= −f
(
T⋃
t=1
(B(t,r) ∩Rj(y(t,i−1)))
)
(since Rj(y(t,i−1)) ⊆ ⋃Tt=1B(t,r))
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≥ −
T∑
t=1
f(B(t,r) ∩Rj(y(t,i−1))) (by submodularity)
≥ −Tf(OPT) (since f(S) ≤ f(OPT) for any subset S of a basis)
Thus Xj ∈ [−Tf(OPT), f(OPT)].
Since Lemma 3.2 does not assume monotonicity of f , it still holds. Therefore, by linearity of
expectation, it also holds that
E
[
w˜
(t,i)
D (u)
]
=
1
s
s∑
j=1
E[Xj] = F (y
(t,i−1) + η(1− y(t,i−1u )1u)− F (y(t,i−1)) = w(t,i)D (u) (4)
We recall that Corollary 2.11 gives us a concentration bound for the mean of s random variables
bounded in [0, R]. Here, we have that each Xj ∈ [r1, r2], where r1 = −Tf(OPT), r2 = f(OPT),
and R = r2 − r1 = (T + 1)f(OPT). Applying Corollary 2.11 to the shifted random variables
X ′j = Xj − r1 ∈ [0, R] and substituting for s = 48r3T 7 log nγ > 12 r
2T 3(T+1)
η2 log
nrT+1
γ , α =
η
2rT 2 , and
β = ηf(OPT)2rT , we get:
P
[
w˜
(t,i)
D (u) < (1− α)w(t,i)D (u)− β + αr1
]
≤ exp(−sαβ/R)
⇒P
[
w˜
(t,i)
D (u) < (1−
η
2rT 2
)w
(t,i)
D (u)−
ηf(OPT)
2rT
− η
2rT 2
· Tf(OPT)
]
≤ exp
(
−s η2rT 2 ηf(OPT)2rT
(T + 1)f(OPT)
)
⇒P
[
w˜
(t,i)
D (u) < (1−
η
2rT 2
)w
(t,i)
D (u)−
ηf(OPT)
rT
]
≤ exp
( −sη2
4r2T 3(T + 1)
)
⇒P
[
w˜
(t,i)
D (u) < (1−
η
2rT 2
)w
(t,i)
D (u)−
ηf(OPT)
rT
]
≤ γ
nrT+1
.
Similarly,
P
[
w˜
(t,i)
D (u) > (1 + α)w
(t,i)
D (u) + β − αr1
]
≤ exp(−sαβ/3R)
⇒P
[
w˜
(t,i)
D (u) > (1 +
η
2rT 2
)w
(t,i)
D (u) +
ηf(OPT)
2rT
+
η
2rT 2
· Tf(OPT)
]
≤ exp
(
−s η2rT 2 ηf(OPT)2rT
3(T + 1)f(OPT)
)
⇒P
[
w˜
(t,i)
D (u) > (1 +
η
2rT 2
)w
(t,i)
D (u) +
ηf(OPT)
rT
]
≤ exp
( −sη2
12r2T 3(T + 1)
)
⇒P
[
w˜
(t,i)
D (u) > (1 +
η
2rT 2
)w
(t,i)
D (u) +
ηf(OPT)
rT
]
≤ γ
nrT+1
.
It follows by union bound that with probability 1− 2γ/nrT+1,
(
1− η
2rT 2
)
w
(t,i)
D (u)−
ηf(OPT)
rT
≤ w˜(t,i)D (u) ≤
(
1 +
η
2rT 2
)
w
(t,i)
D (u) +
ηf(OPT)
rT
.
The number of all possible sequences of points y(t,i) is at most the number of possible sequences of
picked points u(t,i), which is bounded by nrT . By union bound over all sequences of points y(t,i) and
elements u ∈ N , the inequalities hold with probability at least 1− 2γ.
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4.2 Utility
We are now ready to prove the utility guarantee of our algorithm. Note that, by the dummy
elements added in the beginning of the algorithm, we can assume that for every round (t, i),
maxu∈N (t,i) w˜
(t,i)
D (u) ≥ 0 and |B(t,r)| = r.
Also, note that Claims 3.4 and 3.5 of Section 3, which establish the guarantees of the Exponential
Mechanism, hold for the new weights w˜(t,i)(u) as their proofs follow exactly the same steps.4
Theorem 4.3. With probability at least 1− 3γ,
F (y(T,0)) ≥ (1/e−O(η))f(OPT)− 8r
ηε0
log
nr
ηγ
.
Proof. We condition on the event that for all rounds t ∈ [T ], i ∈ [r], and elements u ∈ N ,
(
1− η
2rT 2
)
w
(t,i)
D (u)−
ηf(OPT)
rT
≤ w˜(t,i)D (u) ≤
(
1 +
η
2rT 2
)
w
(t,i)
D (u) +
ηf(OPT)
rT
.
By Lemma 4.2, this is true with probability at least 1− 2γ. It holds that
F (y(t+1,0))− F (y(t,0)) = F (y(t,r))− F (y(t,0))
=
r∑
i=1
[F (y(t,i))− F (y(t,i−1))]
=
r∑
i=1
w
(t,i)
D (u
(t,i)) (since y(t,i) = y(t,i−1) + η(1− y(t,i−1)
u(t,i)
)1u(t,i))
≥
r∑
i=1
1
1 + η
2rT 2
w˜
(t,i)
D (u
(t,i))− r ηf(OPT)
(1 + η
2rT 2
)rT
(by Lemma 4.2)
≥ 1
1 + η
2rT 2
r∑
i=1
w˜
(t,i)
D (u
(t,i))− ηf(OPT)
T
By Lemma 2.5, there exists a bijection φ such that φ(u(t,i)) = o(t,i), where OPT = {o(t,1), . . . , o(t,r)}
is the optimal solution. Now, note that since o(t,i) is a feasible option in the i-th round, by the
guarantees of the Exponential Mechanism (Claim 3.5), and by our assumption, with probability
1− γ we have that
w˜
(t,i)
D (u
(t,i)) ≥ max(0, w˜(t,i)D (o(t,i)))−
2
ε0
log
nrT
γ
,
for all rounds i ∈ [r] and t ∈ [T ]. We condition on this event for the rest of the proof.
It follows that with probability 1− 3γ,
F (y(t+1,0))− F (y(t,0)) ≥ 1
1 + η2rT 2
r∑
i=1
max(0, w˜
(t,i)
D (o
(t,i)))− ηf(OPT)
T
− 2r
ε0
log
nrT
γ
≥ 1−
η
2rT 2
1 + η
2rT 2
r∑
i=1
max(0, w
(t,i)
D (o
(t,i)))− 2ηf(OPT)
T
− 2r
ε0
log
nrT
γ
(5)
To bound the LHS of inequality (5), we prove the following claim.
4Since adding the dummy elements increases the size of the ground set to 2n, the additive error of the Exponential
Mechanism is larger than the bound of Claim 3.5 by 2
ε0
log(2). We omit it since it only at most doubles the additive
error of the final solution.
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Claim 4.4. For all t ∈ [T ],
r∑
i=1
max(0, w
(t,i)
D (o
(t,i))) ≥ η[F (y(t,r) ∨ 1OPT)− F (y(t,r))].
Proof of Claim 4.4. By the definition of the weights, it holds that
r∑
i=1
max(0, w
(t,i)
D (o
(t,i))) =
r∑
i=1
max(0, F (y(t,i−1) + η(1 − y(t,i−1)
o(t,i)
)1o(t,i))− F (y(t,i−1)))
=
r∑
i=1
max(0, η(1 − y(t,i−1)
o(t,i)
)[F (y(t,i−1) ∨ 1o(t,i))− F (y(t,i−1) ∧ 1o¯(t,i))])
=
r∑
i=1
max(0, η[F (y(t,i−1) ∨ 1o(t,i))− F (y(t,i−1))])
≥ η
r∑
i=1
[F (y(t,r) ∨ 1o(t,i))− F (y(t,r))]
≥ η[F (y(t,r) ∨ 1OPT)− F (y(t,r))],
where the inequalities follow by submodularity and the fact that y(t,r) ≥ y(t,i−1) for all i ∈ [r]. Thus,
the claim has been proven.
Next, we invoke the following lemma.
Lemma 4.5 (Feldman 2012, Lemma 3.2.8). Consider a vector y ∈ [0, 1]N . Assuming yu ≤ a for
all u ∈ N , then for every set S ⊆ N , F (y ∨ 1S) ≥ (1− a)f(S).
In the next claim, we prove that for all t ∈ [T + 1] and u ∈ N , y(t,0)u satisfies the assumption of
the lemma for the corresponding parameter a = 1− e−ηt +O(η). We prove the Claim 4.6 following
the proof of Lemma 3.2.9 by Feldman [2012].
Claim 4.6. For every t ∈ [T + 1] and u ∈ N , it holds that y(t,0)u ≤ 1− e−ηt +O(η).
Proof. We will first prove by induction that y(t,0)u ≤ 1 − (1 − η)t for every u ∈ N . For t = 1,
y
(1,0)
u = 0 ≤ 1 − (1 − η) = η. Let us assume that y(t,0)u ≤ 1 − (1 − η)t. We will prove the bound
y
(t+1,0)
u ≤ 1− (1− η)t+1. Note that in each round, y(t,0)u will either not increase or, if u = u(t,i) for
some i ∈ [r], it will increase by η(1− y(t,i−1)u ). It follows that for any u ∈ N
y(t+1,0)u ≤ y(t,0)u + η(1 − y(t,i−1)u )
≤ y(t,0)u + η(1 − y(t,0)u ) (since y(t,0)u ≤ y(t,i−1)u )
= (1− η)y(t,0)u + η
≤ (1− η)(1 − (1− η)t) + η (by the inductive hypothesis)
= (1− η)− (1− η)t+1 + η
= 1− (1− η)t+1.
To prove the claim, it remains to prove that for any t ∈ [T + 1], 1− (1 − η)t ≤ 1− eηt + O(η).
It holds that
1− (1− η)t ≤ 1− [e−1(1− η)]ηt
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= 1− e−ηt(1− η)ηt
≤ 1− e−ηt(1− (T + 1)η2)
≤ 1− e−ηt +O(η),
by using standard inequalities. This concludes the proof of the claim.
By Claim 4.6, which we just proved, the condition of Lemma 4.5 holds for x = y(t,r) = y(t+1,0)
and S = OPT. Thus,
F (y(t,r) ∨ 1OPT) ≥ (e−(t+1) −O(η))f(OPT).
Combining this bound with Claim 4.4, it follows that
r∑
i=1
max(0, w
(t,i)
D (o
(t,i))) ≤ (e−(t+1) −O(η))f(OPT).
Finally, by the latter and returning to inequality (5), we have showed that
F (y(t+1,0))− F (y(t,0))
≥ 1−
η
2rT 2
1 + η
2rT 2
η[(e−η(t+1) −O(η))f(OPT)− F (y(t+1,0))]− 2ηf(OPT)
T
− 2r
ε0
log
nrT
γ
≥ η[(1 − 2 · η
2rT 2
)(e−η(t+1) −O(η))f(OPT)− F (y(t+1,0))]− 2ηf(OPT)
T
− 2r
ε0
log
nrT
γ
≥ η[(1 − η
rT 2
)e−η(t+1)f(OPT)− F (y(t+1,0))]−O(η)f(OPT)
T
− 2r
ε0
log
nrT
γ
where the second to last inequality holds by non-negativity.
To simplify and solve this recursive relation, let us denote Ω = (1 − η
rT 2
)f(OPT) and ξ =
O(η)f(OPT)T +
2r
ε0
log nrTγ . Then, we can rewrite the inequality as follows:
F (y(t+1,0))− F (y(t,0)) ≥ η[e−η(t+1)Ω− F (y(t+1,0))]− ξ
⇔F (y(t+1,0)) ≥ F (y
(t,0))
1 + η
+
ηe−η(t+1)
1 + η
Ω− ξ
1 + η
(6)
We will prove by induction that
F (y(t,0)) ≥ η(t− 1)e−ηtΩ− η2(t− 1)Ω − (t− 1)ξ. (7)
For t = 1, F (y(1,0)) = f(∅) ≥ 0, which satisfies the inequality. Let us assume that inequality (7)
holds. Then
F (y(t+1,0)) ≥ F (y
(t,0))
1 + η
+
ηe−η(t+1)
1 + η
Ω− ξ
1 + η
(by (6))
≥ η(t− 1)e
−ηt
1 + η
Ω− η
2(t− 1)
1 + η
Ω− (t− 1)ξ
1 + η
+
ηe−η(t+1)
1 + η
Ω− ξ
1 + η
(by (7))
= ηe−η(t+1)
(
eη(t− 1)
1 + η
+
ηeη(t+1)
1 + η
+
1
1 + η
)
Ω− η
2t
1 + η
Ω− ξt
1 + η
≥ ηe−η(t+1)
(
eη(t− 1)
1 + η
+
ηeη(t+1)
1 + η
+
1
1 + η
)
Ω− η2tΩ− ξt
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≥ ηe−η(t+1)
(
(t− 1) + η
1 + η
+
1
1 + η
)
Ω− η2tΩ− ξt (since eη ≥ 1 + η)
≥ ηe−η(t+1)tΩ− η2tΩ− ξt.
Thus, inequality (7) holds for all t ∈ [T + 1]. For t = T + 1, substituting Ω and ξ, we get
F (y(T+1,0)) ≥ ηTe−η(T+1)Ω− η2TΩ− Tξ
≥ e−2η−1Ω− 2ηΩ − Tξ (since 1 + η ≥ ηT ≥ 1)
≥ e−2η−1(1− η
rT 2
)f(OPT)− 2η(1 − η
rT 2
)f(OPT)−O(η)f(OPT)− 2rT
ε0
log
nrT
γ
≥ (1− 2η)
e
(1− η
rT 2
)f(OPT)−O(η)f(OPT)− 2rT
ε0
log
nrT
γ
(since e−x ≥ 1− x)
≥ (1/e−O(η))f(OPT)− 2rT
ε0
log
nrT
γ
≥ (1/e−O(η))f(OPT)− 8r
ηε0
log
nr
ηγ
. (since T = ⌈ 1η ⌉ ≤ 2η )
This concludes the proof of the lemma.
4.3 Privacy Analysis
The privacy analysis of Algorithm 2 follows the same structure as the one of the previous section,
but the fact that f is non-monotone requires a few new key observations.
Intuitively, in the monotone case, we managed to bound the ratio of the privacy loss by a
function of a sum of expected marginal gains and rely on the concentration of Claim 3.8 to prove
that this sum is bounded by the sum of realized marginal gains, which, in turn, was at most 1 since
the function fI is monotone and 1-decomposable.
In the non-monotone case, the ratio of the privacy loss can again be bounded by a function of a
sum of expected absolute marginal gains.5 The next lemma and its corollary allow us to bound the
sum of realized absolute marginal gains, which we will use to invoke Claim 3.8 again, to establish
the privacy guarantees of Theorem 4.9 at the end of this section. Bounding this sum is not as trivial
as in the monotone case: the “movement” of a non-monotone function could be unbounded, even
though the function has a bounded range, so we have to leverage the fact that fI is submodular.
The main idea is to use submodularity to bound the total “increase” of the function, which, since
the function has a bounded range, leads to a bound of the total “decrease” of the function as well.
Lemma 4.7. Let fI : 2
[n] → [0, 1] be a submodular function. Then
n∑
i=1
|fI({1, . . . , i}) − fI({1, . . . , i− 1})| ≤ 2− fI(∅).
Moreover, since the order of the elements of [n] is arbitrary, by the triangle inequality, this implies
that for any sequence of non-decreasing sets ∅ = T0 ⊆ T1 ⊆ · · · ⊆ Tr ⊆ [n],
r∑
i=1
|fI(Ti)− fI(Ti−1)| ≤ 2− fI(∅).
5Note that this is also the case for monotone functions, but the absolute marginal gain is the same as the marginal
gain, as it is always positive.
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Proof. Let Si = {1, . . . , i}. Suppose T = {it : t = 1, . . . , k}, for some k ∈ [n], is the set of indices
for which fI(Sit)− fI(Sit−1) ≥ 0. Then, by submodularity, for t = 1, . . . , k we have that
fI(Sit)− fI(Sit−1) ≤ fI(T ∩ Sit)− fI(T ∩ Sit−1) = fI(i1, . . . , it)− fI(i1, . . . , it−1).
Summing over the range of t ∈ [k], it follows that
k∑
t=1
fI(Sit)− fI(Sit−1) ≤ fI(i1, . . . ik)− fI(∅) ≤ 1− fI(∅)
⇒
k∑
t=1
|fI(Sit)− fI(Sit−1)| ≤ 1− fI(∅) (8)
Similarly, we let j1, . . . jℓ be the indices for which fI(Sjt)− fI(Sjt−1) < 0. Then
k∑
t=1
fI(Sit)− fI(Sit−1) +
ℓ∑
t=1
fI(Sjt)− fI(Sjt−1) =
n∑
i=1
fI(Si)− fI(Si−1)
⇒
ℓ∑
t=1
fI(Sjt)− fI(Sjt−1) = fI([n])− fI(∅) −
k∑
t=1
fI(Sit)− fI(Sit−1)
⇒
ℓ∑
t=1
fI(Sjt)− fI(Sjt−1) ≥ −1 (by (8))
⇒
ℓ∑
t=1
|fI(Sjt)− fI(Sjt−1)| ≤ 1 (9)
Adding inequalities (8) and (9), we get the result.
Corollary 4.8. Consider any sequence of elements v(t,i) and solutions y(t,i) so that y(t,i) = y(t,i−1)+
η(1− y(t,i−1))1v(t,i) . Then
T∑
t=1
r∑
i=1
∣∣∣GI(y(t,i−1) + η(1− y(t,i−1))1v(t,i))−GI(y(t,i−1))∣∣∣ ≤ 2− fI(∅).
Proof.
T∑
t=1
r∑
i=1
∣∣∣GI(y(t,i−1) + η(1− y(t,i−1))1v(t,i))−GI(y(t,i−1))∣∣∣
=
T∑
t=1
r∑
i=1
∣∣∣∣∣∣
s∑
j=1
fI({u : rju < y(t,i)})− fI({u : rju < y(t,i−1)})
s
∣∣∣∣∣∣ (by the definition of y(t,i))
≤ 1
s
s∑
j=1
T∑
t=1
r∑
i=1
|fI({u : rju < y(t,i)})− fI({u : rju < y(t,i−1)})| (by the triangle inequality)
We observe that the sequence of sets {u : rju < y(t,i)} that occur as the arguments of fI is a
non-decreasing sequence of sets, and hence Lemma 4.7 applies to give us
T∑
t=1
r∑
i=1
∣∣∣GI(y(t,i−1) + η(1− y(t,i−1))1u(t,i))−GI(y(t,i−1))∣∣∣ ≤ 1s
s∑
j=1
(2− fI(∅)) = 2− fI(∅)
This concludes the proof of the corollary.
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We are new ready to prove the next theorem which establishes the privacy guarantees of our
algorithm.
Theorem 4.9. Algorithm 2 is ((14 + 4 log 1δ )ε0, δ)-differentially private.
Proof. Let A and B be two sets of agents such that A△B = {I}. Suppose that instead of the
output set, we reveal the sequence in which we pick the elements of our algorithm and let this
sequence be denoted as U = (u(1,1), u(1,2), . . . , u(T,r)). Note that the sequence U might include
some dummy elements. We are then interested in bounding the ratio of the probabilities that the
output sequence be U under input A and B. By the post-processing property (Lemma 2.8), this
suffices to achieve the same privacy parameters over the output of the algorithm, which is the set
Swap-Rounding(y(T,r),I) with any dummy elements removed.
We recall that the scores of the Exponential Mechanism, as defined in line 10 of Algorithm 2, are
w˜
(t,i)
D (u) = G(y
(t,i−1) + η(1 − y(t,i−1))1u)−G(y(t,i−1)). For ease of notation, we drop the irrelevant
parameters of our algorithm and denote it by M . By the chain rule of probability,
P[M(A) = U ]
P[M(B) = U ]
=
T∏
t=1
r∏
i=1
exp
(
ε0
2 w˜
(t,i)
A (u
(t,i))
)
/
∑
u∈N (t,i) exp
(
ε0
2 w˜
(t,i)
A (u)
)
exp
(
ε0
2 w˜
(t,i)
B (u
(t,i))
)
/
∑
u∈N (t,i) exp
(
ε0
2 w˜
(t,i)
B (u)
)
=

 T∏
t=1
r∏
i=1
exp
(
ε0
2 w˜
(t,i)
A (u
(t,i))
)
exp
(
ε0
2 w˜
(t,i)
B (u
(t,i))
)



 T∏
t=1
r∏
i=1
∑
u∈N (t,i) exp
(
ε0
2 w˜
(t,i)
B (u)
)
∑
u∈N (t,i) exp
(
ε0
2 w˜
(t,i)
A (u)
)

 (10)
We bound these two factors separately. We assume without loss of generality that A \B = {I}.
We upper and lower bound the first factor as follows.
T∏
t=1
r∏
i=1
exp
(
ε0
2 w˜
(t,i)
A (u
(t,i))
)
exp
(
ε0
2 w˜
(t,i)
B (u
(t,i))
) = T∏
t=1
r∏
i=1
exp
(ε0
2
w˜
(t,i)
I (u
(t,i))
)
= exp
(
T∑
t=1
r∑
i=1
ε0
2
w˜
(t,i)
I (u
(t,i))
)
= exp
(
ε0
2
T∑
t=1
r∑
i=1
GI(y
(t,i−1) + η(1 − y(t,i−1))1u(t,i))−GI(y(t,i−1))
)
= exp
(ε0
2
(
GI(y
(T,r))−GI(y(1,0))
))
.
Since fI has range in [0, 1], it follows that
exp(−ε0/2) ≤
T∏
t=1
r∏
i=1
exp
(
ε0
2 w˜
(t,i)
A (u
(t,i))
)
exp
(
ε0
2 w˜
(t,i)
B (u
(t,i))
) ≤ exp(ε0/2). (11)
Next, we upper and lower bound the reciprocal of the second factor as follows.
T∏
t=1
r∏
i=1
∑
u∈N (t,i) exp
(
ε0
2 w˜
(t,i)
A (u)
)
∑
u∈N (t,i) exp
(
ε0
2 w˜
(t,i)
B (u)
)
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=T∏
t=1
r∏
i=1
∑
u∈N (t,i) exp
(
ε0
2 w˜
(t,i)
I (u)
)
exp
(
ε0
2 w˜
(t,i)
B (u)
)
∑
u∈N (t,i) exp
(
ε0
2 w˜
(t,i)
B (u)
)
=
T∏
t=1
r∏
i=1
E
u←P (t,i)
[
exp
(ε0
2
w˜
(t,i)
I (u)
)]
=
T∏
t=1
r∏
i=1
E
u←P (t,i)
[
exp
(ε0
2
(GI(y
(t,i−1) + η(1− y(t,i−1))1u)−GI(y(t,i−1)))
)]
(12)
≤
T∏
t=1
r∏
i=1
E
u←P (t,i)
[
exp
(ε0
2
∣∣∣GI(y(t,i−1) + η(1− y(t,i−1))1u)−GI(y(t,i−1))∣∣∣)]
≤ exp
(
(eε0/2 − 1)
T∑
t=1
r∑
i=1
E
u←P (t,i)
[∣∣∣GI(y(t,i−1) + η(1 − y(t,i−1))1u)−GI(y(t,i−1))∣∣∣]
)
, (13)
where the last inequality follows by subsequently applying ex ≤ 1 + eε0/2−1ε0/2 · x ∀x ∈ [0,
ε0
2 ], and
1 + t ≤ et ∀t.
By using Claim 3.8, we will upper bound the sum of expected absolute marginal gains
(T,r)∑
(t,i)=(1,1)
E
u←P (t,i)
[∣∣∣GI(y(t,i−1) + η(1 − y(t,i−1))1u)−GI(y(t,i−1))∣∣∣].
Again, consider a Tr-round probabilistic process. In each round (t, i), an adversary chooses a
distribution P (t,i) and then a sample u(t,i) is drawn from that distribution. Let
Z(t,i) = 2− fI(∅)−
(t,i−1)∑
(τ,j)=(1,1)
∣∣∣GI(y(τ,j))−GI(y(τ,j−1))∣∣∣.
By Corollary 4.8, it holds that Z(t,i) ≥ 0. One can think of the quantity Z(t,i) as tracking
the remaining progress towards the total sum of the absolute realized values of the marginal gains,
namely,
(T,r)∑
(t,i)=(1,1)
∣∣∣GI(y(t,i−1) + η(1− y(t,i−1))1u(t,i))−GI(y(t,i−1))∣∣∣.
We also define the random variable
R(t,i)(u) =
∣∣GI(y(t,i−1) + η(1− y(t,i−1))1u)−GI(y(t,i−1))∣∣
Z(t,i)
.
The distribution of R(t,i)(u), denoted by D
(t,i), is directly determined by P (t,i). Also note that, since
Z(t,i) ≥ 0, R(t,i)(u) ≥ 0. By Corollary 4.8,
∣∣∣GI(y(t,i−1) + η(1− y(t,i−1))1u)−GI(y(t,i−1))∣∣∣+ (t,i−1)∑
(τ,j)=(1,1)
∣∣∣GI(y(τ,j))−GI(y(τ,j−1))∣∣∣ ≤ 2− fI(∅).
Therefore, R(t,i)(u) ∈ [0, 1]. After the element of the round u(t,i) has been chosen, we update
Z(t,i) = Z(t,i−1) − R(t,i−1)(u(t,i))Z(t,i−1). Finally, let Y(τ,j) =
∑
(t,i)≥(τ,j) E
u←P (t,i)
[
R(t,i)(u)
]
Z(t,i). By
these definitions, the sum we want to bound is exactly Y(1,1).
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By Claim 3.8, the sum Y(1,1) as defined through this random process satisfies
P
[
Y(1,1) ≥ qZ(1,1)
] ≤ exp(3− q)
⇔P[Y(1,1) ≥ q(2− fI(∅))] ≤ exp(3− q)
⇒P[Y(1,1) ≥ 2q] ≤ exp(3− q)
⇒P
[
T∑
t=1
r∑
i=1
E
u
[∣∣∣GI(y(t,i−1) + η(1 − y(t,i−1))1u)−GI(y(t,i−1))∣∣∣] ≥ 6 + 2 log 1
δ
]
≤ δ (14)
Therefore, with probability 1− δ, by inequalities (13) and (14),
T∏
t=1
r∏
i=1
∑
u∈N (t,i) exp
(
ε0
2 w˜
(t,i)
A (u)
)
∑
u∈N (t,i) exp
(
ε0
2 w˜
(t,i)
B (u)
) ≤ exp((eε0/2 − 1)(6 + 2 log 1
δ
)
)
. (15)
To complete the proof, it remains to lower bound the reciprocal of the second factor of equa-
tion (10). By the same calculations that led to equation (12) again we have
T∏
t=1
r∏
i=1
∑
u∈N (t,i) exp
(
ε0w˜
(t,i)
A (u)
)
∑
u∈N (t,i) exp
(
ε0w˜
(t,i)
B (u)
)
≥
T∏
t=1
r∏
i=1
E
u←P (t,i)
[
exp
(
−ε0
2
∣∣∣GI(y(t,i−1) + η(1− y(t,i−1))1u)−GI(y(t,i−1))∣∣∣)]
≥
T∏
t=1
r∏
i=1
E
u←P (t,i)
[
1− ε0
2
∣∣∣GI(y(t,i−1) + η(1 − y(t,i−1))1u)−GI(y(t,i−1))∣∣∣] (ex ≥ 1 + x ∀x)
≥ exp
(
−ε0
T∑
t=1
r∑
i=1
E
u←P (t,i)
[∣∣∣GI(y(t,i−1) + η(1− y(t,i−1))1u)−GI(y(t,i−1))∣∣∣]
)
.
(1− t ≥ e−2t ∀t ∈ [0, 1/2])
By inequality (14), we have that with probability 1− δ,
T∏
t=1
r∏
i=1
∑
u∈N (t,i) exp
(
ε0w˜
(t,i)
A (u)
)
∑
u∈N (t,i) exp
(
ε0w˜
(t,i)
B (u)
) ≥ exp(−ε0(6 + 2 log 1
δ
)
)
. (16)
Combining inequalities (11), (15), and (16), we conclude that for any sets such that A\B = {I},
with probability 1− δ, the probability ratio is bounded in the range:
exp
(
−(eε0/2 − 1)(7 + log 1
δ
)
)
≤ P[M(A) = U ]
P[M(B) = U ]
≤ exp
(
ε0
(
7 + 2 log
1
δ
))
.
Thus, for any two neighboring sets such that A ∼ B, Algorithm 2 is ((14 + 4 log(1/δ))ε0, δ)-
differentially private.
5 Experiments
In this section we describe two experiments evaluating the performance of the Private Continu-
ous Greedy (PCG) algorithm of Section 3. We replicate the Uber location selection experiment
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in [Mitrovic et al., 2017], comparing the PCG algorithm and its rank invariant noise addition with
the composition-law based differentially private greedy (DPG) algorithm, introduced in that paper.
We also study a hard instance of a partition matroid constraint where PCG significantly outperforms
the discrete DPG of [Mitrovic et al., 2017] in utility, even when the latter uses the rank invariant
privacy parameter.
Following Mitrovic et al. [2017], we consider the problem of picking r public waiting spots for
Uber cabs that are close to potential pick-up requests in Manhattan. This is done by using a dataset
of Uber pick-ups in April 2014 [UberDataset, 2014], in which each record contains the latitude and
longitude of a pick-up. The goal is to choose a good set of waiting locations which satisfy the given
cardinality or matroid constraints, while satisfying differential privacy with respect to the pick-ups,
each of which is assumed to represent only one individual.
We first describe the metric used to define the utility of a set of locations. We recall that
the normalised ℓ1 (or Manhattan) distance between a waiting location l = (lx, ly) and a pick-up
p = (px, py) is given by the expression
M(l, p) =
|lx − px| − |ly − py|
C
,
where C is a minimal normalisation factor such that M(l, p) ∈ [0, 1] for our choice of locations and
pick-ups. We proceed to define the utility of a non-empty set of locations S evaluated on a dataset
of pick-ups D as
fD(S) =
∑
p∈D
(
1−min
l∈S
M(l, p)
)
= |D| −
∑
p∈D
min
l∈S
M(l, p). (17)
Setting fD(∅) = 0, it can be checked that the function fD for any non-empty dataset D is a positive
monotone decomposable submodular function.
5.1 Cardinality constraint
Our first experiment is for the case of the decomposable monotone submodular function defined
in (17) and an r-cardinality constraint. We compare our PCG algorithm (Algorithm 1) with the
general monotone submodular maximization algorithm DPG of Mitrovic et al. [2017]. Their theo-
retical utility guarantees are (1−1/e−η)f(OPT)− r lognηε and (1−1/e)f(OPT)− r
3/2 logn
ε , respectively.
6
These bounds imply that settings with low rank are more favourable for DPG (for which ε0 is set
according to the basic DP composition as ≈ ε/r) and settings with high rank are more favourable
for PCG (where ε0 ≈ ε as in line 2 of Algorithm 1). We want to investigate the performance of
PCG in the high rank regime.
We follow Mitrovic et al. [2017] and use a grid over downtown Manhattan as potential waiting
locations. We note that this cardinality problem is easier than general cardinality constrained sub-
modular maximization. Because of its structure and the density of the points, the problem reduces
to an easy instance of a Geometric Maximum Coverage problem, which admits a PTAS [Li et al.,
2015]. As is, a large randomly selected set performs well and gets close to the maximum utility.
Indeed, in practice we found that a randomly chosen set performs about as well as the other algo-
rithms beyond rank r = 10 in a direct re-implementation of the experiment. To make the instance
harder for random selection while virtually the same in difficulty for most algorithms, we add a
large number of copies of the northern corner of the grid to the set of choices.
6As Mitrovic et al. [2017] state, their algorithm with the privacy parameter calculated using basic DP composition
often performs better than the one that uses advanced. We always check which of the two initializations of DPG
performs better and use this for our comparison.
29
10 15 20
80
85
90
95
Rank r
U
ti
lit
y
Utility versus rank, ε = 0.1
This work
Greedy
MBKK
Random
Figure 1: Empirical performance of non-private greedy, PCG, DPG, and random selection under
the cardinality constraint.
Concretely, to conduct this harder variant of the location selection experiment we choose the set
of possible locations as a 5× 4 grid of locations in the fixed box, and 80 copies of its northernmost
vertex. For each execution, we choose m = 100 pickups uniformly at random from our dataset and
evaluate the empirical utilities of DPG and our PCG. In PCG, we set η = 0.2 and use s = 1000
samples to calculate the marginal gains with respect to the function G (i.e., the proxy of F ). We
also measure the performance of the non-private greedy which has optimal utility as a yardstick,
and that of a randomly chosen basis set that serves as a trivial private baseline. We set ε = 0.1 and
δ = 1/m1.5 where m = |D| = 100. For these choices of privacy parameters, the privacy parameter
used in the differentially private choices of increment is about ε0 = 0.01006.
In Figure 1, we see that for this experiment the PCG algorithm starts to outperform the DPG
algorithm around rank r = 10, but that again both private algorithms become equivalent to picking
a uniformly random set around rank r = 20. It is around r = 10 that our setting for ε0 starts to
be larger than the rank-sensitive privacy parameter ε/r used in each round of the DPG algorithm,
which justifies this trend. For the intermediate rank domain r ∈ [10, 20], both algorithms outperform
the utility offered by a random basis set, but fall short of the non-private greedy which has optimal
utility, as expected. In this regime, PCG confers an advantage to DPG.
5.2 Partition matroid constraint
As noted in [Mitrovic et al., 2017], in the decomposable case with matroid constraints, DPG com-
bined with the privacy analysis of [Gupta et al., 2010] gives the optimal additive error (see Table 1).
In this section, we demonstrate that, even in this case, the 12 multiplicative approximation factor in
the DPG guarantee is not a pessimistic upper bound but in fact a tight one. To see why this is, we
look at the trace of the non-private discrete greedy in a simple 3-element partition matroid.
Let S = {A,B,C} be the ground set, and {{A}, {B,C}} be the partition. We let our matroid
structure be a simple rank-1 constraint on each partition, i.e. sets in the matroid can have at
most one element from each partition. For monotone increasing submodular functions it follows
that the choice is essentially between {A,B} and {A,C}. If the submodular function is such that
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Figure 2: Empirical performance of PCG and DPG under the partition matroid constraint.
f({B}) > f({A}), f({C}) but f({A,B}) < f({A,C}) then the greedy algorithm will consistently
choose the sub-optimal choice, B, and then be forced to pick A. In particular, if f({B}) = 1 and
f({A}) = f({C}) = 1− ǫ, but f({A,B}) = 1 and f({A,C}) = 2− 2ǫ (which is readily extended to
a submodular function), then the utility gained by the greedy is 12−2ǫ times the optimal utility.
We test the practical performance of DPG and PCG in this type of worst-case instance. Although
the noise induced by privacy would help DPG overcome this pitfall with some probability, our
experiments show that the bound presented above is realized in the experiment. To replicate this
instance, we pick three points in Manhattan which mimic this partition structure (with B closest
to downtown, and A and C slightly further away) and compare the DPG and the PCG algorithms
on a range of dataset sizes. The utility obtained is divided by the number of points in the dataset
which is an upper bound for the optimal utility.
In Figure 2, we compare the average utilities obtained by PCG (with η = 1/7 and δ = 1/m1.5)
and DPG with the improved privacy analysis. The error bars at each point mark 1-standard
deviation confidence intervals. Although their performances are comparable for small datasets, the
improvement of PCG increases as the dataset grows in size. There is high variance due to the random
choice of the dataset for each set size, but the separation between the empirical confidence intervals
still widens with larger datasets. We find that for these types of worst-case instances, compared
to DPG (even with the improved privacy analysis) a significant performance enhancement can be
obtained by switching to PCG for the decomposable setting.
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